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An Intent-Based Approach to the Acceptance of Benefits 
Doctrine in the Federal Courts 
Benson K. Friedman 
INTRODUCTION 
A plaintiff wins a judgment in federal district court. Although the 
plaintiff believes that the judgment does not fully address her claim, 
the defendant tenders and the plaintiff accepts the full amount or a 
substantial portion of the judgment. The plaintiff then proceeds to 
appeal in an effort to increase the judgment. The defendant may have 
tendered the payment in an attempt to settle the litigation. Alterna-
tively, the defendant may have offered the payment for a variety of 
reasons not based on an offer to settle: the defendant may have 
sought, but been denied, a stay of the judgment pending appeal; the 
defendant may have sought to convince the plaintiff to release liens on 
the defendant's property; the defendant may have wished to encourage 
the plaintiff to drop the appeal because the prospect of winning more 
does not justify incurring the cost of proceeding further; or interest on 
the judgment may be greater than the value of the money to the de-
fendant. On appeal, the defendant claims that the plaintiff may not 
now appeal after accepting the payment. 
Under the common law acceptance of benefits doctrine, a plaintiff 
who accepted a substantial portion of the benefits of a judgment 1 could 
not appeal the amount of the award unless the case fell within one of 
two exceptions.2 First, a plaintiff could appeal if the defendant did not 
contest the amount of the payment. This exception allowed a plaintiff 
to proceed if the defendant admittedly owed the amount of the pay-
ment. Second, the plaintiff could appeal despite accepting the pay-
ment if the judgment involved divisible issues. Under this exception, 
the plaintiff could still appeal when the payment concerned a com-
pletely distinct claim from the one the plaintiff contested on appeal. 
This traditional formulation of the acceptance of benefits doctrine 
1. A plaintiff could accept the substantial benefits of a judgment by receiving payment of a 
major portion of a monetary award or by enforcing an injunction. 
2. See generally Annotation, Right To Appeal from Judgment as Affected by Acceptance of 
Benefit Thereunder - Federal Cases, 5 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1960) (assessing the adherence to the 
traditional rule among the federal circuit courts of appeals). Courts treated this issue distinctly 
from whether the party who paid a judgment still could appeal. When a party pays a judgment, 
the federal courts traditionally have allowed that party to appeal nonetheless. See, e.g., Cahill v. 
New York, N. Haven & Hart. R.R., 351 U.S. 183, 184 (1956); Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 
U.S. 222, 224 (1885); Chicago Great Ry. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394, 397-98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 781 (1945). 
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prevailed in the U.S. circuit courts until 1960,3 when the Supreme 
Court invalidated the common law rule in United States v. Hougham. 4 
In Hougham, the federal government won a judgment in district court 
against a defendant who had fraudulently acquired surplus war mater-
ials. 5 The defendant tendered a promissory note for the amount of the 
judgment and asked the United States to release liens on his property. 
The government complied, and both parties appealed the trial court 
decision. In the Supreme Court, the defendant, relying on the accept-
ance of benefits doctrine, argued that acceptance of the promissory 
note prevented the United States from appealing. The Court rejected 
the argument and stated: "It is a generally accepted rule of law that 
where a judgment is appealed on the ground that the damages 
awarded are inadequate, acceptance of payment of the amount of the 
unsatisfactory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an ac-
cord and satisfaction of the entire claim."6 The dissent disagreed with 
this statement and would have adhered to the traditional formulation 
of the rule. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hougham relied on 
Embry v. Palmer1 for their conflicting conclusions. In Embry, the 
plaintiff accepted the defendant's payment of $2,296.25 out of a 
$9,185.18 award. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that, by accepting the $2,296.25, the plaintiff waived his right to 
appeal because the defendant admittedly owed the plaintiff the amount 
of the payment. The Court said: 
Without entering upon a discussion of the general question, it is suffi-
cient for the present purpose to say that no waiver or release of errors, 
operating as a bar to the further prosecution of an appeal or writ of 
error, can be implied, except from conduct which is inconsistent with the 
claim of a right to reverse the judgment or decree. . . . The amount 
awarded, paid, and accepted constitutes no part of what is in contro-
versy. Its acceptance by the plaintiff in error cannot be construed into an 
admission that the decree he seeks to reverse is not erroneous; nor does it 
take from the defendants in error anything, on the reversal of the decree, 
to which they would otherwise be entitled; for they cannot deny that this 
sum, at least, is due and payable from them to him. 8 
3. See, e.g., Kantor v. American & Foreign Power Co., 197 F.2d 307, 315 (1st Cir. 1952); 
Wilson v. Pantasote Co., 254 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1958); Spencer v. Babylon Ry., 250 F. 24, 26 
(2d Cir. 1918); Smith v. Morris, 69 F.2d 3, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1934); Firefrock v. Kenova Mine Car 
Co., 37 F.2d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 1930); Kaiser v. Standard Oil, 89 F.2d 58, 59 (5th Cir. 1937); 
Spane! v. Berkman, 171 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1949); Worthington v. Beeman, 91 F. 232, 234 
(7th Cir. 1899); Sorley v. Armour & Co., 107 F.2d 499, 504 (8th Cir. 1939). 
4. 364 U.S. 310 (1960). 
5. The government sued under 40 U.S.C. §§ 484, 489 (1988). Section 484 gives veterans 
priority preferences in the purchase of surplus war materials. Section 489(b) authorizes the 
United States to recover damages against any person who acquires surplus property fraudulently. 
6. 364 U.S. at 312. 
7. 107 U.S. 3 (1883). 
8. 107 U.S. at 8. 
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The reliance on Embry by both the majority and the dissent in 
Hougham made for a confusing situation. The Court in Embry explic-
itly refused to extend the holding beyond the specific facts of the case. 
The Hougham Court, however, extended the rule in Embry to a case 
in which the defendant contested the entire award and cited Embry for 
the proposition that acceptance of the benefits of a judgment does not 
prevent appeal.9 The dissent, though, read Embry differently and 
pointed out that Embry did not upset the prevailing rule because the 
facts fell within a well-recognized exception that allowed appeal by the 
plaintiff when the defendant did not contest the amount of the pay-
ment.10 Justice Whitaker's dissenting opinion also demonstrates that, 
despite assertions to the contrary in the majority opinion, the rule 
stated in Hougham ran contrary to the prevailing rule in the circuit 
courts of appeals.11 
The vague scope of the holding in Hougham, combined with the 
apparent departure from the prevailing rule, caused confusion in the 
federal courts. Some circuits followed the literal language of 
Hougham to the extent possible, some maintained the old rule, and 
still others manufactured new rules. 12 This confusion has multiplied 
in diversity actions. In diversity actions since Hougham, circuits have 
divided on whether to apply the federal rule or a state rule to address 
acceptance of benefits problems. The conflicting views on the federal 
rule under Hougham and on the choice of law in diversity cases leave a 
confusing trap for the unwary plaintiff who might wish to accept pay-
ment of all or part of an unsatisfactory judgment. 
This Note discusses the question of when federal courts should al-
low a party who accepts payment of a judgment subsequently to ap-
peal the deficiency of the award. Part I examines the discrepancies 
currently existing in the acceptance of benefits doctrine as applied by 
the federal courts. Part II analogizes this issue to the law of implied-
in-fact contracts and argues that accepting the benefits of a judgment 
should not prevent an appeal unless circumstances clearly indicate a 
mutual intent to settle all claims and thereby terminate litigation. Part 
III contends that, under the doctrine expressed in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 13 federal courts should apply this proposed rule in diversity 
actions. This Note concludes that federal courts should apply a uni-
form, intent-based rule both in cases arising under federal law and in 
diversity actions. 
9. See 364 U.S. at 312 (citing Embry, 107 U.S. at 3). 
10. See 364 U.S. at 319 (Whitaker, J., dissenting). 
11. See 364 U.S. at 320-21 (Whitaker, J., dissenting) (noting that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Eighth Circuits followed the traditional rule). 
12. See infra section I.A. 
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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I. THE ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS DOCTRINE 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
745 
In 1960, for the first time since 1883, the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue whether a party who accepts payment of a substantial por-
tion of a judgment still may appeal the amount of the award. 
Although the opinion in United States v. Hougham stated that a plain-
tiff does not relinquish her right to appeal solely by accepting the bene-
fits of a judgment, 14 the vague decision gave little guidance to lower 
courts regarding what facts would preclude an appeal. The federal 
courts consequently developed a variety of approaches to address this 
question. This Part analyzes the federal decisions in the aftermath of 
United States v. Hougham. Section I.A discusses the variety of rules 
on the acceptance of the benefits of a judgment that have evolved in 
the circuit courts since Hougham. Section I.B examines the conflict-
ing cases in which courts have addressed the corresponding choice of 
law issue in the specific context of diversity actions. 
A. The Circuit Courts 
The first line of cases to address the acceptance of benefits doctrine 
after Hougham began with a decision by the Fourth Circuit that made 
no reference to the Supreme Court's holding. In Gadsden v. Fripp, 15 
the court created a new rule that allowed a plaintiff who accepts pay-
ment of a judgment to appeal unless the circumstances indicate a mu-
tual intent to terminate litigation. The plaintiff in Gadsden had 
brought a diversity action to recover damages for an abandoned at-
tempt by county officials to condemn the plaintiff's real estate. At a 
hearing on a motion for summary judgment, the district court 
awarded the plaintiff some $1700 in damages, which was less than the 
amount the plaintiff claimed. After entry of the judgment, the defend-
ant offered a check for the amount of the judgment, and the plaintiff 
accepted it. The plaintiff then appealed in an effort to reverse the sum-
mary judgment, and the defendants sought to dismiss the appeal under 
the traditional acceptance of benefits doctrine. The court rejected the 
defendant's argument and stated: 
When a payment of a judgment is made and accepted under such cir-
cumstances as to indicate an intention to finally compromise and settle a 
disputed claim, an appeal may be foreclosed, but, under such circum-
stances, it is the mutual manifestation of an intention to bring the litiga-
tion to a definite conclusion upon a basis acceptable to all parties which 
bars a subsequent appeal, not the bare fact of payment of the 
judgment. 16 
Gadsden did not rely on Hougham but instead analogized to the com-
14. See 364 U.S. at 312. 
15. 330 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1964). 
16. 330 F.2d at 548. 
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mon law rule that payment of a judgment does not prevent a defend-
ant from appealing,17 even though traditionally federal courts had 
treated paying defendants and accepting plaintiffs differently. 18 Since 
the Fourth Circuit's decision, three other circuits have adopted the 
Gadsden rule. 19 
The Second Circuit, in comparison, has ostensibly followed the let-
ter of Hougham and has declared only that acceptance of benefits does 
not, in and of itself, prevent appeal. In DiLeo v. Greenfield, 20 the 
board of education of a local school district fired DiLeo, a tenured 
teacher, for "improper conduct. "21 DiLeo challenged his termination 
in federal court. In his suit, DiLeo claimed that the termination hear-
ing admitted hearsay in violation of his due process rights. After the 
district court reinstated diLeo, the board of education again fired him. 
DiLeo then challenged as unconstitutionally vague the statute under 
which the board of education fired him. The district court rejected the 
claim but awarded DiLeo damages for the time he was out of work 
between the first and second hearing. DiLeo accepted payment of the 
damages and proceeded to appeal the district court's ruling on the 
constitutionality of the statute. The board of education sought to dis-
miss the appeal under the acceptance of benefits doctrine. The Second 
Circuit found that the case involved divisible issues and that DiLeo's 
claim on appeal did not relate to the one for which he received the 
payment. 22 The court then proceeded to state in dicta that even if this 
had been a case involving the acceptance of benefits, Hougham would 
have allowed an appeal.23 The court acknowledged that it adopted a 
different rule than Gadsden v. Fripp when it noted that it would have 
arrived at the same result even if it had applied the test of Gadsden. 24 
Under the Second Circuit approach, no established set of circum-
stances directs a court to deny a plaintiff's appeal. Unlike Gadsden, 
which declared that the mutual intent of the parties would defeat a 
plaintiff's right to appeal, the Second Circuit allows an appeal unless 
the facts meet some unknown threshold level that goes beyond the 
"standing alone" language of Hougham. Until the Second Circuit 
elaborates on this threshold, this approach would appear to allow 
more appeals than would the Gadsden rule because no set of circum-
stances, such as mutual intent, can cut off a plaintiff's appeal rights. 
17. 330 F.2d at 548. 
18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
19. See McGowen v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. H & 
S Indus. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. 
v. Friendly Broadcasting Co., 414 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1969). 
20. 541 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1976). 
21. 541 F.2d at 951. 
22. 541 F.2d at 952. 
23. 541 F.2d at 952. 
24. 541 F.2d at 953. 
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Several other courts continue to recognize the validity of the old 
common law rule on the acceptance of benefits, despite Hougham and 
subsequent decisions. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has applied 
the traditional rule and barred a plaintiff's appeal. In Fidelcor 
Mortgage Corp. v. Insurance Co., 25 Fidelcor brought suit against its 
insurer to obtain indemnity after a third party successfully sued 
Fidelcor for fraud, slander of title, and punitive damages. Fidelcor 
appealed the district court finding that the insurance policy only cov-
ered the slander claim. After filing the notice of appeal, Fidelcor ac-
cepted payment of the amount of the judgment and executed a 
satisfaction of judgment on a standard form. This form acknowledged 
that the plaintiff received payment in the amount of the judgment and 
authorized the clerk of the court to record that fact. 26 The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected Fidelcor's arguments that the fraud and slander 
claims constituted separable issues and dismissed the appeal. 27 The 
court also rejected the notion that Fidelcor's subjective intent to ap-
peal had any relevance in this context. 28 The court then relied on a 
pre-Hougham Second Circuit case29 and the traditional acceptance of 
benefits rule to dismiss Fidelcor's appeal. 30 
The Fidelcor court may have implicitly assumed that the signing of 
the satisfaction of judgment form indicated that the plaintiff intended 
to settle the case. If so, the decision would have put the Eleventh 
Circuit in line with the Gadsden approach, which explicitly relies on 
intent. But even if the Fidelcor court agrees with the Fourth Circuit, 
the decision still poses difficulties because the court ostensibly adhered 
to the common law rule and legitimated its continued use in the 
future. 
Other courts have recognized the validity of the pre-Hougham ac-
ceptance of benefits doctrine while analyzing cases within existing ex-
ceptions. In Price v. Franklin Investment Co., 31 the buyer of a used car 
sued the seller and the assignee of the loan contract under the Truth in 
Lending Act32 and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z.33 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyer and 
against the seller and dismissed the claims against the assignee loan 
company along with the pendent state claims. Although the court had 
not yet determined the attorney fees award, the plaintiff accepted pay-
25. 820 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987). 
26. 820 F.2d at 369. 
27. 820 F.2d at 369-70. 
28. 820 F.2d at 370. 
29. Wilson v. Pantasote Co., 254 F.2d 700, 702 (2d Cir. 1958). 
30. 820 F.2d at 370. 
31. 574 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
32. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 
(1988)). 
33. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1993). 
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ment of the judgment by the car seller and then appealed in an effort 
to challenge the dismissal of the claims against the loan company. 
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia first recognized the 
traditional rule: "It is a settled rule of law that a litigant may not 
accept all or a substantial part of the benefit of a judgment and subse-
quently challenge the unfavorable aspects of that judgment on ap-
peal."34 The court then allowed the appeal under an exception to the 
common law rule that applies if the judgment concerns divisible is-
sues. 35 The court decided it could consider the issues divisible for two 
reasons: first, the statute might allow for separate recovery against the 
seller and the loan company; second, the seller and loan company 
might be jointly liable, in which case the loan company's liability 
could affect still undetermined attorneys' fees.36 Under the Act, the 
"issues affecting the determination of these [attorneys'] fees have an 
independent significance and should be appealable."37 Although it 
came to the same result as it would have reached had the court fol-
lowed Hougham, 38 the District of Columbia Circuit framed its deci-
sion in a manner consonant with the traditional acceptance of benefits 
doctrine. 
In some post-Hougham cases, to prevent injustice, courts that still 
recognize the general validity of the acceptance of benefits doctrine as 
a bar to appeal have made liberal use of exceptions to the rule in order 
to allow a plaintiff to appeal. In Cherokee Nation v. United States, 39 
for example, the Cherokee Nation had won a $13 million judgment 
against the federal government. The Indian Claims Commission then 
awarded the Cherokee Nation's attorneys 6.96% of the award for their 
fees, more than three percent less than the specified contingency in the 
contract between the attorneys and the tribe. The attorneys accepted 
payment of the award and then appealed in an effort to increase it to 
ten percent. The Court of Claims recognized the general rule that a 
party usually may not accept the benefits of an award and then chal-
lenge the deficiency of the award.40 However, the court reasoned that 
this rule applies only when a party accepts the benefits voluntarily.41 
In this case, the court found that the attorneys did not accept payment 
of their fees voluntarily; personal illness and financial troubles 
34. 574 F.2d at 597. 
35. 574 F.2d at 597. 
36. 574 F.2d at 597-98. 
37. 574 F.2d at 598. 
38. Under Hougham, the attorneys' acceptance of the fee payment by itself would not defeat 
the plaintiff's right to appeal. 
39. 355 F.2d 945 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
40. 355 F.2d at 949. 
41. 355 F.2d at 949 (citing 4 AM. JuR. 2o Appeal and Error§ 251 (1962), along with two 
state cases, Miller v. Lobdell, 241 P.2d 30 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Greenspot Desert Inns v. 
Roy, 146 P.2d 39 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944)). 
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"forced" the attorneys to accept payment.42 Like the Franklin Invest-
ment court, the Cherokee Nation court arrived at a result that did not 
conflict with the rule in Hougham, but at the same time recognized the 
validity of the old acceptance of benefits doctrine for subsequent 
courts facing the same issue. 
B. Choice of Law: Acceptance of Benefits in Diversity 
Aside from the confusion concerning which federal rule to follow, 
the acceptance of benefits doctrine has presented another question to 
the federal courts. Federal courts, sitting in diversity, have had to de-
cide whether to apply the federal rule as they perceive it, or a state 
rule. Different circuits have variously applied either federal or state 
law to the issue. 
In United States ex rel. H & S Industries v. F.D. Rich Co., 43 the 
Seventh Circuit had to determine whether to apply the state or federal 
acceptance of benefits rule in a diversity action between a contractor 
and a subcontractor. In a prior diversity case, the Seventh Circuit had 
accepted and commented favorably on a stipulation of counsel to ap-
ply Indiana law, which would prevent an appeal after the acceptance 
of benefits.44 However, the court in F.D. Rich found that the aims 
identified by the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 45 -
"discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws - would not be served by applying state law 
to a problem of procedure which would arise, if at all, after completion 
of trial."46 It therefore followed the most common federal practice 
and applied the Fourth Circuit federal rule from Gadsden v. Fripp. 47 
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, when presented with the same 
issue, applied the state rule on the acceptance of benefits. Wyn.field 
Inns v. Edward Leroux Group, Inc. 48 involved a hotel franchise dispute 
between a Florida general partnership and a Massachusetts corpora-
tion. The plaintiff won a judgment in the district court on its quantum 
meruit claim, but the court dismissed a related contract claim by a 
directed verdict. The plaintiff then appealed the directed verdict after 
accepting and registering payment of the quantum meruit judgment. 
42. 355 F.2d at 949. 
43. 525 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1975). 
44. See Moser v. Buskirk, 452 F.2d 147, 149 (7th Cir. 1971). 
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court decided that federal courts sitting in 
diversity must apply state substantive law rather than general federal common law. For more 
background on Erie and subsequent decisions that refined the Erie doctrine, see infra section 
III.A. 
46. 525 F.2d at 764. 
47. Under the Gadsden rule, the mutual intention to terminate litigation, rather than the 
mere acceptance of benefits by the plaintiff, cuts off the appeal rights of the plaintiff. For a more 
detailed discussion of Gadsden, see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
48. 896 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applied Florida common law without 
comment and concluded that the acceptance of the payment of the 
quantum meruit judgment constituted a case of acceptance of bene-
fits. 49 Relying on McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing & Construction 
Co., so the court decided that Florida follows the traditional acceptance 
of benefits rule. The plaintiff could not appeal after accepting payment 
of the judgment because neither exception to the rule applied: the con-
tract and quantum meruit claims did not constitute divisible claims, 
and the defendant contested the amount of judgment.st 
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Hougham, rather than set-
tling questions on the applicability of the acceptance of benefits doc-
trine, in fact disturbed the existing uniformity among federal courts. 
Although most circuits have abandoned the traditional rule, their cri-
teria for precluding appeal differ. A few circuits, meanwhile, still rec-
ognize the pre-Hougham rule. Part II of this Note argues for a 
uniform federal rule that would strictly follow the criteria established 
by the Fourth Circuit in Gadsden v. Fripp. s2 Part III contends that 
federal law on the acceptance of benefits, and not state law, should 
apply in diversity actions. 
II. RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL RULE 
This Part attempts to resolve the confusion that has arisen in the 
federal courts since Hougham and the resultant conflicting rules con-
cerning when federal courts should allow a plaintiff who has accepted 
payment of a judgment to appeal the deficiency of the award. Section 
II.A first analyzes the two approaches courts have taken to decide 
whether a party can appeal despite the acceptance of benefits: waiver 
of appeal and mootness. Section II.A then identifies the similarities 
between the two approaches to facilitate a uniform approach to ac-
ceptance of benefits cases in general. Because the cases involve no ex-
press agreement to terminate the litigation, courts have had to decide 
whether to infer an agreement that would constitute a waiver or that 
would render a case moot. Section II.B then demonstrates that the 
law of implied contract provides a theory that advises courts when to 
infer such an agreement between parties. Applying implied contract 
theory, section II.C concludes that federal courts should adopt a strict 
version of the rule established by Gadsden v. Fripp and allow an appeal 
unless both parties demonstrably and unambiguously intend to termi-
nate litigation. Finally, section II.D analyzes the pitfalls of this rule 
49. 896 F.2d at 489. As an alternate theory, the appeals court also found that the plaintiff 
had elected its remedy by accepting payment of the quantum meruit judgment and could not 
appeal under the inconsistent contract claim. 896 F.2d at 488-89. 
50. 146 So. 567 {Fla. 1933). 
51. 896 F.2d at 489. 
52. 330 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1964). 
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- the problems of reversal of the judgment on appeal and administra-
tive difficulty - and maintains that the merits of the proposed rule 
outweigh these drawbacks. 
A. Waiver and Mootness 
Courts facing the question whether to allow a plaintiff to appeal 
after accepting benefits have approached the issue from one of two 
directions. On the one hand, some courts have found that, by ac-
cepting the benefits, the plaintiff has waived the right to appeal.53 Fed-
eral courts give widespread deference to express agreements to waive 
appeal rights, 54 suggesting an easy answer to the question. 
In acceptance of benefits cases, however, the parties have not 
reached an explicit agreement. Thus, a court must decide whether to 
infer a waiver from the plaintiff's actions. The Supreme Court 
adopted the waiver approach in Embry v. Palmer. 55 The Court rea-
soned that the plaintiff's acceptance of the defendant's payment did 
not constitute an implied waiver of an appeal. Instead, the Court re-
quired acts comparable to an admission of the validity of the trial 
court judgment before it would find that a plaintiff waived an appeal. 56 
The waiver analysis resembles the alternative approach taken by 
other federal courts, which asks whether the parties have actually set-
tled a case. 57 Such a settlement after the trial court judgment gener-
ally would moot an appeal. 58 Like the waiver cases, these cases arise 
when no express settlement agreement exists between the parties. 
53. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. Mckee, 159 U.S. 303, 311 (1895); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 8 
(1883); Wynfield Inns v. Edward Leroux Group, Inc., 896 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1990); Fidelcor 
Mortgage Corp. v. Insurance Co., 820 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir. 1987); Cherokee Nation v. United 
States, 355 F.2d 945, 949-50 (Ct. CJ. 1966). 
54. See In re Lybarger, 793 F.2d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Gillette Co., 723 F.2d 
192, 192 (1st Cir. 1983); Goodsell v. Shea, 651 F.2d 765, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1981); United States 
Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Chaddock & Co., 173 F. 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1909); 4 AM. JuR. 2D 
Appeal and Error § 236 (1962); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 210 (1957). In Brown, the court 
prevented an appeal after the parties agreed "that the determination of the [district] Court on 
such claims shall be final and binding and hereby waive any and all rights of appeal with respect 
to such determinations." 723 F.2d at 192. 
55. 107 U.S. 3, 8 (1883) ("[N)o waiver or release of errors, operating as a bar to the further 
prosecution of an appeal or writ of error, can be implied, except from conduct which is inconsis-
tent with the claim of a right to reverse the judgment or decree."); see also Cherokee Nation v. 
United States, 355 F.2d 945, 949-50 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ("If one who accepts the benefits of a judg-
ment or decree does so under compulsion rather than voluntarily, he incurs no waiver. Waiver 
consists of a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.") (citations omitted). 
56. See 107 U.S. at 8. 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310 (1960); McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1980); Price v. Franklin Inv., 574 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
58. See Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120 (1985) (per curiam); Local 
No. 8-6, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Intl. Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 368-69 (1960); 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir. 
1991); 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.2 
(Supp. 1993). 
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Thus, indirect evidence, rather than clear expressions of intent, deter-
mines the result. s9 
These two analyses address the acceptance of benefits question 
similarly. Both depend on the existence of an implied agreement. 
Moreover, the factual inquiries resemble each other. In a waiver anal-
ysis, the court investigates whether the plaintiff has unilaterally for-
feited the right to appeal. Waiver in the acceptance of benefits 
context, though, arises out of an implicit agreement between the de-
fendant and plaintiff that leads the plaintiff intentionally to admit the 
validity of the trial court by accepting the benefits. More fundamen-
tally, then, a court utilizing a waiver approach to the acceptance of 
benefits can search for evidence that establishes an implied agreement 
under which a plaintiff waives an appeal by accepting the defendant's 
payment. Such an agreement, although in principle based on waiver, 
suggests in fact that the parties have settled the case in order to termi-
nate litigation. The mootness approach looks explicitly to whether the 
parties have agreed to settle and concludes that a settlement renders 
an appeal moot because the plaintiff has received full satisfaction of 
her claims. The question then arises: When should courts infer an 
agreement to settle from the actions of the parties? 
B. When To Infer Agreements 
In analyzing whether to infer an agreement from the acceptance of 
benefits, three options exist. A court could decide never to infer agree-
ments in this context and instead apply a rule that allows a plaintiff to 
appeal in every case. Alternatively, courts could always infer agree-
ments whenever the plaintiff accepts payment of the judgment. This 
would result in a rule similar to the traditional rule stating that nor-
mally the plaintiff can never appeal after accepting payment from the 
defendant. 60 Finally, a court could find a rule somewhere between 
these two extremes. This section examines the purposes of settlement 
agreements and the nature of the right to appeal, and it uses those 
considerations to determine the best approach. 
1. Option One: Never Infer Agreements 
A rule that would never allow courts to infer an agreement to set-
tle when a plaintiff accepts the benefits of a judgment would fail to 
accommodate situations in which parties clearly intended to settle and 
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. H & S Indus. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764-65 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Friendly Broadcasting Co., 414 F.2d 750, 752 (9th 
Cir. 1969). 
60. The two exceptions did mitigate the harshness of the traditional rule somewhat. Under 
the traditional rule, the plaintiff could still appeal if the defendant admittedly owed the plaintiff 
the amount of the payment or if the defendant made the payment with respect to an issue distinct 
from the one on which the plaintiff based the appeal. 
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finally to resolve a case. Such a rule would frustrate the strong federal 
policy favoring voluntary settlement of civil disputes.61 
Courts provide several reasons for the policy favoring settlements. 
Settlement agreements conserve judicial and individual resources by 
eliminating unnecessary proceedings62 and helping control the backlog 
of cases in the courts. 63 In addition, they provide amicable and mutu-
ally agreeable solutions to the disputes. 64 Thus, federal courts have 
expressed a desire to enforce settlements whenever possible. 65 
Although most courts expressed these policy goals in the context 
of settlements before or during trials, these goals also apply to agree-
ments not to appeal. 66 Appellate courts face the same need to elimi-
nate unnecessary proceedings, and they also seek to encourage 
voluntary and amicable solutions to disputes. A satisfactory accept-
ance of benefits rule should further, or at least not frustrate, these 
goals. 
2. Option Two: Always Infer Agreements 
A rule that would require courts always to infer a waiver also cre-
ates problems. By foreclosing an appeal in all acceptance of benefits 
cases, this rule could frustrate both parties' manifest intent in cases in 
which both the plaintiff and defendant contemplated an appeal despite 
the payment. In so doing, this type of rule could violate the plaintiff's 
statutory right to appeal a live controversy.67 
61. See Williams v. First Natl. Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910) ("Compromises of disputed 
claims are favored by the courts .... "); American Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 
1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Few public policies are as well established as the principle that 
courts should favor voluntary settlements oflitigation by the parties to a dispute."); Aro Corp. v. 
Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.) ("Public policy strongly favors settlement of 
disputes without litigation."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Loftin, 
440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir.) ("Settlement agreements are highly favored in the law and will be 
upheld whenever possible .... "), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 
1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial 
favor."); Gomes v Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Voluntary settlements are to be 
encouraged ... . ");see also Alyson M. Weiss, Note, Federal Jurisdiction To Enforce a Settlement 
Agreement After Vacating a Dismissal Order Under Rule 60(b)(6), 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2137, 
2137 (1989). 
62. See American Sec. Vanlines, 782 F.2d at 1060 n.5; Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372; Autera, 
419 F.2d at 1199; Weiss, supra note 61, at 2137. 
63. See Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372. 
64. See Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372; D.H. Overmeyer Co., 440F.2d at 1215; Autera, 419 F.2d 
at 1199. 
65. See Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372 ("Settlement agreements should therefore be upheld 
whenever equitable and policy considerations so permit."); D.H. Overmeyer Co., 440 F.2d at 
1215; Autera, 419 F.2d at 1199 ("[T]here is everything to be gained by encouraging methodology 
that facilitates compromise."). 
66. See Goodsell v. Shea, 651 F.2d 765, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (discussing the "public policy 
mandate that disputing parties should be encouraged to resolve their disputes through negotia-
tion rather than litigation"). 
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988); Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 
(1980); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169-71 (1974); In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 
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The prevailing rule before Hougham effectively followed this ap-
proach in that it required courts always to infer an agreement except 
in two situations: it allowed an appeal if the defendant did not contest 
the amount the plaintiff accepted or if the judgment involved divisible 
issues. 68 These two exceptions mitigated the harshness of the rule be-
cause they recognized situations in which the parties clearly did not 
intend to settle the litigation. 
Despite the exceptions, courts that followed the traditional rule af-
ter Hougham still ran into difficulties when they attempted to accom-
modate the intent of the parties within the framework of the common 
law doctrine. Courts often stretched the contours of the doctrine in 
order to avoid foreclosing an appeal when the parties clearly did not 
intend to settle. In Cherokee Nation v. United States, 69 for example, 
the court adopted a state court exception that federal courts had not 
used before. The court allowed attorneys who had accepted fee 
awards to appeal for an increase in the award because financial duress 
prevented the attorneys from accepting the award "voluntarily."70 
While this decision expanded the conditions under which the court 
would recognize the intent of the parties, courts adhering to the old 
rule could still violate the intent of the parties under certain circum-
stances. A better approach would recognize the inadequacy and the 
questionable validity of the traditional rule after Hougham and adopt 
an approach that makes explicit the need to respect the intent of the 
parties. 
3. Option Three: Implied Settlement Agreements 
Such all-or-nothing rules do not provide workable solutions to the 
acceptance of benefits question. In some cases, courts should prevent 
an appeal - for example, when the parties clearly intended to settle. 
In other cases, courts should allow appeals despite the acceptance of 
benefits because the parties did not intend to settle. Hougham presents 
an example of such a situation: the defendant made the payment 
solely so that the government would release liens on his property. 
This section provides a framework courts could use in determining 
whether to bar an appeal after acceptance of benefits. 
One proposed solution directs courts to distinguish between pay-
ments in satisfaction of judgments and payments in satisfaction of 
claims. 71 If the payments satisfy a claim, the parties have settled; if 
1398-99 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane); 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 
203.04 (2d ed. 1993). 
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
69. 355 F.2d 945 (Ct. Cl. 1966). For more on the Cherokee Nation decision, see supra notes 
39-42 and accompanying text. 
70. 355 F.2d at 949. 
71. See Annotation, supra note 2. 
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the payments only satisfy a judgment, the parties have not settled. Yet 
this solution provides no reliable basis on which to distinguish a satis-
faction of a judgment from a satisfaction of a claim. Often, parties will 
not express which they intend to do or will confuse the two. 72 Thus, 
although this idea provides a neat theoretical solution, it leaves courts 
in an equally impractical position. 
This Note argues instead that courts should apply the law of im-
plied-in-fact contracts by analogy to determine when to allow an ap-
peal. The law of implied contract instructs courts when to enforce 
implied-in-fact agreements generally. When an implied-in-fact con-
tract exists, it binds parties just as an express one does.73 To establish 
an implied-in-fact contract, courts have required the same basic ele-
ments that they require for an express contract, but they have allowed 
parties to prove these elements through different means. 74 These ele-
ments include mutuality of intent, offer and acceptance, and valid 
consideration. 1s 
These elements of implied-in-fact contracts provide the conditions 
under which a court should bar an appeal. To establish a binding 
agreement, implied contract doctrine would require a showing of offer 
and acceptance, valid consideration, and a mutual intent of the parties 
that the plaintiff waive the right to appeal or that the parties settle the 
case. This section considers these elements in turn to demonstrate the 
propriety of applying implied contract theory to the acceptance of ben-
efits issue. 
The element of offer and acceptance in an implied-in-fact contract 
arises from the actions of the parties. By paying the judgment, the 
defendant may implicitly offer to settle the case. 76 By accepting the 
defendant's payment, the plaintiff may thereby accept the defendant's 
offer to settle the case. Acceptance of the benefits of an offer consti-
tutes an action that can suffice to imply acceptance of the offer.77 The 
72. Fidelcor Mortgage Corp. v. Insurance Co., 820 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1987), serves as an 
example of the difficulties inherent in this approach. In Fide/car, the plaintiff accepted payment 
of a judgment, executed an ambiguous satisfaction of judgment form, and still appealed the judg-
ment. The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, perhaps based on an implicit determination of 
the intent of the parties. The court decided the plaintiff had consented to entry of the judgment 
and could not appeal, although the plaintiff had only completed a boilerplate satisfaction of judg-
ment form. It would seem, then, that a court could easily mistake the completion of a satisfac-
tion of judgment form as evidence of satisfaction of a claim. 
73. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS§ 18 (1963); see also Crosby v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 414 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1969). 
74. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540, 544-45 (1989); Miles v. Tennessee 
River Pulp & Paper Co., 862 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1989); Nitol v. United States, 7 Cl. 
Ct. 405, 415 (1985); Russell Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 474, 482 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Kirk v. 
United States, 451 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1971). 
75. Chavez. 18 Cl. Ct. at 544-45; Nita!, 7 Cl. Ct. at 415; Russell Corp .• 537 F.2d at 482. 
76. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 73, § 11. 
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(l)(a) (1979). 
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U.S. Claims Court, in Chavez v. United States, 78 acknowledged the va-
lidity of such an implied acceptance and stated that: 
the circumstances of a contract implied-in-fact must indicate that the 
parties have in fact taken upon themselves corresponding obligations and 
liabilities, and have come to a meeting of the minds. 
An implied-in-fact contract may be created through the acceptance 
of benefits with the knowledge that the [offeror] expects to be 
compensated. 79 
According to the Chavez court, the acceptance of the benefits creates 
an implied-in-fact contract that consequently imposes the obligation to 
compensate for the benefits - in our case, through an agreement not 
to appeal. 80 Thus, a court may infer offer and acceptance from pay-
ment and acceptance of a judgment. 
Contractual consideration in the context of acceptance of benefits 
problems arises from the defendant's payment of the judgment in re-
turn for the plaintiff's promise to settle or not to appeal. As long as 
the plaintiff believes in the validity of the claim, the plaintiff provides 
consideration sufficient to support an agreement by forgoing his right 
to appeal.81 
Given valid consideration and actions which can serve as offer and 
acceptance, the question whether the acceptance of benefits forms a 
binding agreement reduces to whether the actions of the parties indi-
cate a mutual intent to prevent an appeal. Under a contractual analy-
sis, a court should inquire whether the plaintiff and the defendant 
manifested agreement to the same bargain. 82 The court must deter-
mine whether the offer by the defendant included the requirement that 
the plaintiff waive the right to appeal or settle the case. Also, the court 
must decide whether the plaintiff who accepted payment accepted 
those same terms - that the plaintiff agreed to settle or not to appeal. 
Because acceptance of benefits cases involve no express agreement, the 
court must determine this mutual intent through indirect means. 
C. Application of the Implied Contract Approach 
Implied contract analysis focuses a court's inquiry on the mutual 
understanding of the parties and resembles the rule on the acceptance 
of benefits established by the Fourth Circuit in Gadsden v. Fripp. 83 
The Gadsden court looked to whether the parties intended to termi-
78. 18 Cl. Ct. 540 (1989). 
79. 18 CJ. Ct. at 545 (citations omitted). 
80. 18 Cl. Ct. at 545. 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1979). 
82. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979) (discussing the contractual 
requirement of a meeting of the minds of the parties). 
83. 330 F.2d 545, 548 (4th Cir. 1964). 
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nate the litigation. 84 To effect the mutual inten,t of the parties and to 
protect a plaintiff's right to appeal, courts should apply this modified 
Gadsden rule strictly. Courts should dismiss an appeal only when cir-
cumstances unambiguously indicate a mutual intent to settle and 
thereby terminate litigation, and courts should place the burden of 
demonstrating this mutual intent on the defendant. 
The need for an appellate court to avoid making acceptance of ben-
efits decisions in ambiguous situations stems from the summary pro-
cess by which courts would dismiss an appeal under the acceptance of 
benefits doctrine and from the nature of the appellate rights of a party 
aggrieved by a district court decision. Federal courts have recognized 
that they have the power to enforce settlement agreements summarily, 
without resort to factual hearings. 85 This "simple and speedy ... rem-
edy serves well the policy favoring compromise .... " 86 Such a sum-
mary resolution works especially well in circumstances in which the 
parties concede or demonstrate a binding settlement agreement. 
Ambiguous acceptance of benefits cases, though, present factual 
disputes. This creates difficulties for an appellate court, which in es-
sence makes summary decisions by not holding evidentiary hearings to 
investigate factual issues. Such a summary process "is ill-suited to sit-
uations presenting complex factual issues related either to the forma-
tion or the consummation of the contract, which only testimonial 
exploration in a more plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily re-
solve. "87 Thus, in cases in which settlement agreements present ques-
tions of fact, trial courts have avoided summary decisions and have 
held hearings to investigate the factual issues. 88 
These considerations apply equally well to situations in which an 
appellate court makes the decision concerning a settlement agreement. 
Appellate courts lack the tools to determine factual issues readily, 
such as firsthand examinations of testimony and other evidence. 
These same inadequacies have caused trial courts to refrain from sum-
marily enforcing settlement agreements. Because of their inadequacy 
as factfinders, appellate courts have often remanded cases for factual 
determinations to help decide whether new circumstances have ren-
dered a case moot. 89 Rather than decide to prevent an appeal under 
84. 330 F.2d at 548; see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
85. See, e.g., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 862 (1976); Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
86. Autera, 419 F.2d at 1200; see also Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372. 
87. Autera, 419 F.2d at 1200. 
88. See, e.g., Kukla v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1973). 
89. E.g., Dupris v. United States, 446 U.S. 980 (1980); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 
(1975) (remanding the case to determine the effect of a law enacted after the Court granted 
certiorari); Cedar-Riverside Envtl. Def. Fund v. Hills, 560 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1977) (discuss-
ing the fact findings that the district court made when the circuit court remanded the case for an 
investigation into mootness). 
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ambiguous circumstances, the appellate court faced with an accept-
ance of benefits problem should defer to a better-equipped investigator 
and remand the case to the trial court to determine the intent of the 
parties.90 
When remanding an acceptance of benefits issue to a district court 
in this manner, appellate courts should require the defendant to bear 
the burden of proving a mutual intent to terminate litigation. Ordina-
rily, a party aggrieved by a final district court decision has a statutory 
right to appeal.91 Although a party may waive this right or some oc-
currence may render the appeal moot,92 federal appellate courts pre-
sume that they may hear appeals if the district court had jurisdiction, 
unless a party demonstrates that some occurrence has disturbed the 
statutory right.93 Consequently, the party who suggests that an occur-
rence after the district court judgment has rendered a case moot bears 
the burden of proving mootness.94 As a result, appellate courts faced 
with a factually obscure acceptance of benefits issue should recognize 
the presumed vested appeal rights of the plaintiff who argues that the 
district court decision did not satisfy her. To disturb the right to ap-
peal, appellate courts should require the defendant to demonstrate at a 
district court factual hearing the existence of a mutual intent to termi-
nate litigation. 
This analysis, based on mutual understanding, appears at first 
glance to lack the advantages of bright-line rules such as the tradi-
tional pre-Hougham approach. The proposed rule, however, allows 
courts to distinguish more clearly between closely related cases. In 
one scenario, a defendant, after losing a judgment, sends a check to the 
plaintiff with a note that states clearly "this check is in full payment of 
all claims against me and will terminate all litigation between us." 
The plaintiff who deposits this check has made an unambiguous ges-
ture which signals agreement to the defendant's offer. Consequently, 
courts should not allow this plaintiff to appeal. However, in a case in 
which no note accompanies the check and the plaintiff deposits it, the 
plaintiff's actions have ambiguous meaning.95 In the latter case, an 
appellate court should allow a plaintiff to appeal unless a district 
90. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988), federal appellate courts have the power to remand a case 
for further proceedings as necessary to help them determine appeals: "The Supreme Court or 
any other court of appellate jurisdiction may ... remand the cause and direct the entry of such 
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be 
just under the circumstances." 
91. See supra note 67. 
92. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
93. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Intl., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1975-76 (1993). 
94. Cardinal Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1976; see also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 
U.S. 629, 633 (1953). 
95. This scenario matches Kaiser v. Standard Oil Co., 89 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1937), in which 
the court applied the traditional acceptance of benefits rule to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal. 
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court, looking at all the circumstances, determines that the plaintiff's 
actions constituted an agreement not to appeal. 
This Gadsden-type rule also enables a court to consider a wider 
range of relevant circumstances than the traditional approach. For 
example, in certain circumstances, both the plaintiff and the defendant 
may appeal a trial court judgment. If the defendant pays the judgment 
and yet proceeds with an appeal to reduce the judgment, this should 
serve as strong evidence to combat the existence of a mutual intent to 
settle. Under the traditional rule, though, a plaintiff accepting a pay-
ment under these circumstances could not appeal. 
Not only does this intent-based analysis conform court-inferred 
agreements to the common understanding of the parties, but it also 
provides a unifying theory that lends internal consistency to the ac-
ceptance of benefits jurisprudence, in which the courts have applied a 
variety of rules but arrived at similar results. In Hougham, the 
Supreme Court applied a rule that gave little guidance to lower courts 
except to indicate that they should only reluctantly dismiss an appeal. 
Some statements in the decision, though, demonstrate that the im-
plied-agreement analysis influenced the Court's thinking. The Court 
stated that "acceptance of payment of the amount of the unsatisfac-
tory judgment does not, standing alone, amount to an accord and sat-
isfaction of the entire claim."96 This Note's approach supplements the 
Hougham decision by describing what "standing alone" means. The 
Hougham language allows the payment of a judgment to derail an ap-
peal when the parties mutually intended an end to litigation. The in-
tent-based rule provides more guidance to courts on what actions, in 
addition to payment "standing alone," suffice to prevent an appeal by 
a benefit-accepting plaintiff. 
Cherokee Nation v. United States 97 demonstrates how courts cur-
rently apply an analysis implicitly based on the parties' common un-
derstanding, while ostensibly adhering to other rules. In Cherokee 
Nation, the court found it necessary to apply the old common law 
acceptance of benefits doctrine even though the case came after 
Hougham, but it held that a party could appeal the amount of the 
award if not accepted "voluntarily."98 Federal courts traditionally 
had not relied on this "voluntariness" requirement. Although state 
courts had used it, the Cherokee court's financial duress argument ex-
panded this state exception beyond its usual scope. 99 Thus the court 
96. 364 U.S. 310, 312 (1960). 
97. 355 F.2d 945 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
98. 355 F.2d at 950. 
99. Bibler v. Board of Supervisors, 142 N.W. 1017 (Iowa 1913), exemplifies a state's use of 
the "voluntariness" exception. In Bibler, a statute required public officers to collect the amount 
of the trial court's judgment. The court found that acceptance of a judgment by public officers 
under the statute did not prevent them from appealing the judgment. In Greenspot Desert Inn v. 
Roy, 146 P.2d 39, 42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944), the court did use financial circumstances to 
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reformed the traditional doctrine in response to the attorneys' appar-
ent lack of intent to waive an appeal. Even though the defendants did 
not force the plaintiff's attorneys to accept the fee award, the plain-
tiff's attorneys' financial difficulties led to an inference that they did 
not wish to settle the case or to waive their right to appeal. Under the 
intent-based rule, "involuntary," need-based acceptance of money 
would not preclude seeking more money on appeal unless the party 
demonstrated an unambiguous intent to settle. 
The traditional pre-Hougham rule did defer to the intent of the 
parties under some clear circumstances. Unlike the intent-based rule 
this Note proposes, however, the common law rule placed the burden 
of proof in ambiguous situations on the wrong party, the plaintiff. 
Although the old rule prevented an appeal under most circumstances, 
its exceptions allowed appeal in cases in which the defendant did not 
contest the amount paid to the plaintiff and the judgment involved 
divisible issues. In such cases, the courts saw that the parties did not 
necessarily intend to settle the controversy. In ambiguous situations 
that did not fall within these exceptions, however, the courts automati-
cally barred an appeal and often frustrated the appeal rights and the 
understanding of the parties. 
Courts have moved away from the old rule and have begun to rec-
ognize the logical implications behind an analysis based on intent. 
Although the traditional doctrine forced agreements in violation of the 
shared understanding of the parties, the rule established by Gadsden, 
followed strictly, recognizes the need to identify the underpinnings of 
an agreement before a court can infer a waiver or a settlement. In 
such fashion, a Gadsden-type approach respects the parties' mutual 
intent. This rule also conforms to the Supreme Court's implicit rea-
soning and explicit holding in Hougham. 
D. Drawbacks of an Intent-Based Rule 
This Note's approach to acceptance of benefits questions poses two 
difficulties. First, the rule can present problems when a plaintiff ac-
cepts a judgment that is later reversed on appeal. In such a case, cred-
itors may have devoured the judgment funds and thus would prevent 
the plaintiff from returning the funds to the defendant. Second, the 
rule may be harder to apply from an administrative standpoint. These 
problems deserve consideration. This section concludes, however, that 
these costs do not outweigh the benefits of an intent-based approach to 
the acceptance of benefits doctrine. 
explain why the plaintiffs had not accepted payment of the judgment voluntarily. The plaintiffs 
did not merely face financial difficulties, as in Cherokee Nation, but faced serious financial loss if 
they did not accept payment because of quickly changing wartime economic conditions. 146 
P.2d at 41-42. Additionally, the plaintiffs fell within a well-recognized exception to the general 
rule: they only accepted the part of the judgment admittedly due them. 146 P.2d at 42. 
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By allowing a plaintiff who has accepted benefits to appeal, this 
Note's approach creates a problem if the plaintiff loses on appeal, finds 
the judgment reversed, and cannot repay the defendant the amounts 
he received. Such a scenario may occur when both a plaintiff and a 
defendant appeal after the payment. 100 This difficulty does not arise 
under the original common law rule because the plaintiff can only ap-
peal if the defendant does not contest the amount paid to the plaintiff. 
The Fourth Circuit proposed a solution to this dilemma in 
Gadsden. The court recommended that the district court require the 
plaintiff to repay the amounts he received from the defendant or to 
give a security to the court for its repayment before the district court 
reopened the case.101 Along with the court's recommendations, the 
Gadsden rule avoids the injustice to the plaintiff that the traditional 
acceptance of benefits doctrine created, while it preserves the interests 
of the defendant who has paid the judgment and wants repayment if 
the plaintiff ultimately loses an appeal. 
The proposed approach to the acceptance of benefits based on the 
mutual intent of the parties poses another problem. It creates admin-
istrative costs in ambiguous situations that more definitive rules would 
avoid because cases involving ambiguous circumstances could require 
additional proceedings to determine the intent of the parties. The sav-
ings in administrative costs ranks highly among the reasons that 
courts prefer settlement agreements in the first place. 102 A strictly ap-
plied intent-based rule would seem to conflict with the desire to con-
serve judicial resources. Courts recognize, however, that the policy 
goals of efficiency that support settlements must give way to the need 
to ensure the protection of the parties' rights and the just adjudication 
of the parties' interests. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia approved summary procedures that would avoid factual 
hearings only when they would not infringe on the parties' rights: 
[T]he summary practice for use in connection with problems [is] capable 
of precise resolution without attendant hazard to the interests of the par-
ties. At the same time, it is evident that beyond that point the conven-
ience of the summary procedure must yield to the exigencies of 
safeguarding all legally protected rights that are involved. 10 3 
Administrative costs should concern a court. But respect for the stat-
utory right to appeal 104 and for the intent of the parties should out-
100. A defendant may pay a plaintiff the amount of a judgment and yet appeal to reduce the 
award for a number of reasons: as in Hougham, the defendant may seek to compel the plaintiff to 
release liens on the defendant's property; the defendant may not have been able to obtain a stay 
pending appeal; or the interest on the judgment may exceed the value of the money to the 
defendant. 
101. 330 F.2d 545, 548 (4th Cir. 1964). 
102. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
103. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
104. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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weigh worries over marginal costs of additional proceedings. 
Ill. THE CHOICE OF LAW IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS 
This Note has argued that the federal courts should treat accept-
ance of benefits problems with a uniform, Gadsden-type rule. In diver-
sity actions, federal courts also must address, as a preliminary matter, 
whether to apply the federal or state rule.1°5 Federal courts have dis-
agreed.106 This Part suggests a resolution to the conflict. Section 
III.A provides a background in Erie doctrine to create a framework 
for the choice of law in diversity actions. Section 111.B argues that 
Erie considerations support the application of federal law to the ac-
ceptance of benefits in diversity actions. This Part concludes that fed-
eral courts, even when sitting in diversity, should apply the federal 
acceptance of benefits rule proposed in Part II. 
A. Erie Considerations 
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 107 the Supreme Court decided that 
federal courts in diversity actions could not supplant state substantive 
common law with federal common law. Erie overturned the 1842 de-
cision in Swift v. Tyson 1os and its interpretation of the Rules of 
Decision Act. 109 Swift allowed federal courts to apply an independent 
federal common law to decide substantive common law issues in diver-
sity actions. In Erie, though, the Court reinterpreted the Act to re-
quire federal courts to apply state common law as well as state 
statutory law to substantive issues because "state law" included state 
common law. 
The Erie Court noted several policy reasons behind its decision to 
overturn Swift. The Swift approach, the Court found, granted unfair 
advantages to nonresident plaintiffs who could file suit in the forum 
105. An argument can be made that courts should apply the state acceptance of benefits rule 
on federal question claims as well. This Note only addresses diversity actions for two reasons. 
First, no courts have applied the state rule in cases based on federal causes of action. Second, 
diversity actions present a more difficult case because they do not call into question the workings 
of any federal statutory or common law recovery scheme. Thus, in general, federal courts have 
applied federal law to interpret settlement agreements that resolve federal claims. See, e.g .. 
Parkerv. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 673 F.2d 1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 1982); Fulgence v. J, Ray 
McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208-09 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 
1203 (9th Cir. 1981); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (6th Cir. 1975). 
106. See supra section I.B. 
107. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
108. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
109. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988)). The Act 
provided: 
The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the 
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. 
1 Stat. at 92. Swift interpreted the "laws of the several states" not to include state common law. 
41 U.S. at 12-13. 
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that provided the most advantageous substantive law. 110 Additionally, 
Swift had failed in its attempt to create a uniform general law. Rather 
than follow the federal initiative, states continued to follow their own 
decisions. 111 The Erie Court also noted constitutional objections to 
the Swift decision. The Court found that the federal government "has 
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a 
State."112 Thus, the Court seemed to distinguish between state sub-
stantive law, which federal diversity courts could not supplant, and 
procedural law, on which the Court placed no apparent restrictions. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 113 
attempted to delineate the extent of the holding in Erie. In York, the 
Court recognized the inadequacy of the conclusory labels of "sub-
stance" and "procedure" to decide when a court must apply state law 
in diversity actions. 114 Instead, the Court focused on the policies be-
hind Erie: 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ... expressed a policy that touches vitally the 
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts. 
In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases 
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the di-
versity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the 
federal court should be substantially the same ... as it would be if tried 
in a State court. 115 
The Court focused the substance-procedure distinction on these goals 
and asked: Would the rule "significantly affect the result of a litiga-
tion for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be 
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a 
State court?"116 This marked the emergence of the outcome-determi-
native test and acknowledged Erie's concern that "for the same trans-
action the accident of a suit by a non-resident in a federal court instead 
of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially 
different result."117 
This outcome-determinative test, applied strictly, has proved to be 
problematic. Practically every procedural rule can substantially affect 
the outcome of litigation. Subsequent decisions have demonstrated 
the need for flexibility in the application of the outcome-determinative 
test. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 118 the 
Supreme Court again reconsidered the validity of federal rules applied 
110. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-75. 
111. See 304 U.S. at 73. 
112. 304 U.S. at 78. 
113. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
114. 326 U.S. at 109. 
115. 326 U.S. at 109. 
116. 326 U.S. at 109. 
117. 326 U.S. at 109. 
118. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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in diversity actions. Byrd asked whether a federal court, sitting in di-
versity, should apply a state rule that required the judge to determine 
factual issues relating to an affirmative defense to a workman's com-
pensation claim. The Court rejected the argument that any possibility 
of a federal rule disturbing the outcome required the application of the 
state rule. Instead, the Court took a three-step approach to the ques-
tion whether federal courts can apply the federal rule on a particular 
matter. 
The Byrd Court began by asking whether the state rule in question 
was intended to be "bound up with the definition of the rights and 
obligations of the parties" or whether the rule simply related to the 
form and mode of enforcement of those rights and obligations.119 Erie 
requires that, on a rule so "bound up,'' federal courts apply the state 
rule. However, with a rule related only to the enforcement of state-
created rights, the analysis continued. 
The Court then examined the extent to which the state rule would 
affect the outcome. The Byrd Court recognized that federal courts 
should conform as closely as possible to the state rules, even proce-
dural rules, when the rules might substantially affect the outcome of 
the case. 120 However, the Court then considered "affirmative counter-
vailing considerations"121 that supported the application of a federal 
rule. Such considerations in this case included the federal policy to-
ward allocating functions between the judge and jury and the mainte-
nance of the federal courts as an independent system for administering 
justice. The Court then balanced the desire for uniform outcomes 
against the federal interest in maintaining the judge-jury balance. 122 
In Byrd, the federal interest in the judge-jury balance outweighed out-
come-determinative factors because the court found that the difference 
between a judge or a jury as a factfinder probably would not alter the 
outcome of the case.123 
In a later decision, Hanna v. Plumer, 124 the Supreme Court re-
turned to the outcome-determinative test of York, although it noted 
the need for flexible application. In Hanna, Chief Justice Warren 
stated: " 'Outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to 
serve as a talisman. . . . Indeed, the message of York itself is that 
choices between state and federal law are to be made not by applica-
tion of any automatic, 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather by reference 
to the policies underlying the Erie rule."125 
119. 356 U.S. at 536. 
120. 356 U.S. at 536-37. 
121. 356 U.S. at 537. 
122. 356 U.S. at 537. 
123. 356 U.S. at 540. 
124. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
125. 380 U.S. at 466-67. 
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The Hanna Court then linked the outcome-determinative test with 
the twin goals of Erie - to avoid the inequitable administration of the 
laws and to discourage forum shopping. 126 Because Hanna involved a 
challenge to the application of one of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it did not overturn the balancing test of Byrd with respect 
to federal common law procedural rules. 127 It does, however, provide 
insight into the fact that Erie goals remain implicit in the outcome-
determinative test. 
These cases point to a consideration of competing interests to solve 
Erie problems. On the one hand, Erie and York express the strong 
federal interest in uniform outcomes in state and federal courts and a 
respect for local policies represented by state laws. However, the ex-
tent to which a rule affects an outcome does not end the analysis. 
Byrd recognizes the need to balance that policy against other vital fed-
eral concerns, such as the integrity of the federal judge-jury 
relationship. 
Within this framework, courts must decide which law to apply. 
For an issue such as the acceptance of benefits, which does not impli-
cate a rule codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts 
must look to Byrd interpreted in light of York and Erie to determine 
whether they may apply federal law. Some courts and commentators 
believe these cases establish a multifaceted balancing test that accom-
modates all the competing goals enunciated inErie and its progeny.128 
The Seventh Circuit recognized: "The history of the Erie doctrine has 
been a continual retreat from conclusionary labels or mechanical solu-
tions and an increasing emphasis has been placed on the consideration 
and accommodation of the basic state and federal policy goals in-
volved." 129 Professors Martin Redish and Carter Phillips argue that 
courts confronted with such Erie questions must simultaneously con-
sider three factors: (1) the extent the state procedure is bound up with 
the accomplishment of state substantive policy; (2) federal policy in-
terests that support the application of federal law; and (3) the danger 
126. 380 U.S. at 467-68. 
127. 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4511 (1982). 
128. E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1963); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chameski, 286 F.2d 238, 243 (7th Cir. 1960); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, 
Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1960); John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of 
Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. REV. 791, 812 (1974); Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and 
the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 362-66 
(1977); Allen E. Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's Eye View of Federalism in Diversity 
Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 443, 464-65 (1962). See generally 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
127, §§ 4504, 4511 (explaining the development of the Erie doctrine). 
129. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chameski, 286 F.2d 238, 243 (7th Cir. 1960); see also Howard 
Sticklor, Comment, Federal Judicial Law-Making Power: Competence as a Function of 
Cognizable Federal Interests, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 171, 179 (1976) (arguing that 
federal court competence to apply federal Jaw depends on a weighing of competing federal 
interests). 
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of different outcomes between state and federal forums.13o 
Thus, an Erie analysis should balance, on the one hand, the inter-
est in consistent state-federal outcomes and the right of states to deter-
mine laws concerning local policies and, on the other hand, federal 
interests that argue in favor of a uniform federal rule. This provides a 
framework to decide whether Erie requires courts to apply the state 
rule on the acceptance of benefits in diversity suits. Section 111.B ap-
plies this analysis and argues that federal interests in favor of a uni-
form federal rule outweigh countervailing interests and compel the 
application of the federal rule on the acceptance of benefits in diversity 
actions. 
B. Erie Considerations Applied to the Acceptance of Benefits 
In the case of the acceptance of benefits, policies that favor the 
federal rule include the maintenance of the federal court system, facili-
tation of settlements in appropriate circumstances, and the concern 
with the fair adjudication of claims. Balanced against these, courts 
must consider the policy enunciated in Erie in favor of uniform out-
comes and the federalism concern about federal interference with local 
policies inherent in state laws. This section argues that these compet-
ing interests favor the application of a federal rule on the acceptance of 
benefits in diversity actions. 
1. Interference with State Substantive Rules 
Erie reflects a policy concern that federal courts not interfere with 
the states' regulation of local concerns. The analysis established in 
Byrd questions the extent to which state rules are "bound up" with the 
accomplishment of state substantive policy or whether the rules exist 
as a means of enforcement of that policy. 131 The Fourth Circuit fur-
ther explained this requirement of Byrd: "In a diversity case, state law 
defining and limiting those primary rights and obligations must be ap-
plied under the Erie doctrine, enabling members of society prudently 
to plan and conduct their affairs, whether their conduct will later be 
called into question in a state or a federal court."132 The Erie inquiry 
130. Redish & Phillips, supra note 128, at 364-65. Other commentators argue that courts 
must consider the extent to which a rule is bound up with state substantive policy as a threshold 
matter before balancing outcome-determinativeness against federal interests behind the federal 
rule. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pt. 2), 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 
541, 604-5 (1958); John C. McCoid II, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 
VA. L. REV. 884, 895 (1965). Because this Note argues that the acceptance of benefits is not 
"bound up" with state substantive policies and rights, the difference between these approaches 
does not alter this Note's conclusion that federal courts should apply the federal acceptance of 
benefits rule in diversity actions. 
131. 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958); see also Redish & Phillips, supra note 128, at 364-65. 
132. Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 1969). 
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into the acceptance of benefits question then turns to the purposes be-
hind state rules. 
States commonly justify the traditional acceptance of benefits rule 
on the grounds that accepting payment of the judgment estops the 
plaintiff from talcing the inconsistent approach of claiming error to a 
judgment whose validity the plaintiff has implicitly recognized. 133 
States have also based their acceptance of benefits doctrine on the no-
tion that the acceptance of the payment extinguishes the judgment, so 
the plaintiff has nothing from which to appeal. 134 These rationales 
suggest that the acceptance of benefits is not "bound up" with state 
substantive policies, but rather deals with modes of enforcement of 
substantive rights. State rules on the acceptance of benefits do not 
reflect the concern that courts enforce certain causes of action to re-
flect a state's policies, but instead that litigants not take advantage of 
their court systems with inconsistent claims or by pressing appeals 
when the court has no jurisdiction. Such rules do not require consis-
tent application to enable "members of society prudently to plan and 
conduct their affairs, whether their conduct will later be called into 
question in a state or a federal court."135 Thus, a federal rule on the 
acceptance of benefits would not transgress local substantive policy 
concerns, which focus more on misuse of state courts than final out-
comes. The state court acceptance of benefits justifications do not 
strongly support the application of state rules in federal court. 
Viewing the acceptance of benefits in contractual terms136 might 
lead one to conclude that a federal rule interferes with local policies 
underlying contract law, such as upholding the expectations of the 
parties. This general concern for local contract law has led some fed-
eral courts to apply state law to construe settlement agreements that 
resolve pending diversity suits. 137 Yet the acceptance of benefits rule 
presents more focused considerations than does the interpretation of 
express settlement agreements. Unlike an express settlement agree-
ment, a federal acceptance of benefits rule should not undermine the 
expectations of parties because the parties have not entered into a 
complex, formal contract thinking that local contract law would ap-
ply. Rather, the agreement deals only with the relevant court system 
and appeal rights. Federal courts may hold parties to the knowledge 
of court-related rules of practice and procedure. Thus, federal courts 
can expect that parties litigating in federal court will know how the 
133. See, e.g., Jones v. Hall, 206 S.W. 671, 673 (Ark. 1918); Evarts v. Stovall, 75 P.2d 154, 
155 (N.M. 1938); Tyler v. Shea, 61 N.W. 468, 469 (N.D. 1894). 
134. See, e.g., Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky. 568, 571 (1882); Ingram v. Groves, 202 P. 1019, 1022 
(Okla. 1922); Fly v. Bailey, 36 Tex. 119, 120 (1871). 
135. Wratchford, 405 F.2d at 1065. 
136. See supra section II.B. 
137. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 
(1981); Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 487 (6th Cir. 1973). 
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federal courts react to the acceptance of benefits. To the extent that 
parties may rely on a state rule that follows the traditional doctrine, a 
federal court may take that expectation into account when it investi-
gates the mutual intent of the parties. This ability of a federal court to 
consider the state rule as evidence of mutual intent further minimizes 
any slight impact on party expectations that may result from the im-
position of the federal rule in diversity actions. Additionally, accept-
ance of benefits questions arise far more infrequently than cases in 
which a court must construe express settlement agreements. This, too, 
reduces the already slight chance that a federal acceptance of benefits 
rule applied in diversity actions will upset party expectations. Thus, a 
federal rule in diversity does not conflict with a state's general policies 
on contract law. 
2. Assessing the Federal Interests 
The Erie analysis next focuses on the federal interest in the appli-
cation of a uniform federal rule. In Byrd, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the importance of maintaining "[t]he federal system [as] an 
independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly 
invoke its jurisdiction."138 In Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing 
Co., 139 the Fourth Circuit further stressed the need to preserve the 
integrity of the federal court system through uniform procedures: 
It is, of course, neither possible nor necessary for federal courts to be 
totally neutral in the adjudication of state-created rights .... That state 
and federal judicial systems are not identic will inevitably mean that the 
choice of forum will have some effect upon the course of litigation. Some 
adoption of state court procedures by federal courts sitting in diversity 
may be feasible, but it may also be in conflict with fundamental interests 
of the federal courts in the conduct of their own business and the mainte· 
nance of the integrity of their own procedures, the legitimate interests of 
a federal forum, qua forum. 
Literal application of some of the language in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York might appear to compel the conclusion that a federal court must 
apply the state law in every case where failure to do so might make a 
difference in the outcome of the litigation .... Now, in the choice be· 
tween state and federal law in the disposition of federal procedural 
problems ... we properly take account of federal interests and the effec-
tive functioning of the federal courts as a cohesive, relatively unitary, 
system for the administration of justice. 
That there is a significant federal concern for the application of rules 
of litigation in federal courts which are consistent with the fundamental 
nature of the court system is well established.14o 
138. Byrd Elec. v. Blue Ridge Rural Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
139. 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971). 
140. 435 F.2d at 536-37. 
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By affecting a party's right to appeal errors and the termination of 
cases through settlements, the acceptance of benefits rule implicates 
these concerns about the structure of the federal court system.141 In 
Gamewell Manufacturing, Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 142 the Fourth 
Circuit recognized the procedural interests of federal courts in issues 
that could bring litigation in federal court to a premature end. The 
court commented on settlement agreements: 
Settlements and releases assertedly entered into in respect of federal 
litigation already in progress implicate federal procedural interests dis-
tinct from the underlying substantive interests of the parties. Once a 
claim - whatever its jurisdictional basis - is initiated in the federal 
courts, we believe that the standards by which that litigation may be 
settled, and hence resolved short of adjudication on the merits, are pre-
eminently a matter for resolution by federal common law principles, in-
dependently derived.143 
While the Fourth Circuit made these observations about settle-
ment agreements that arise before a trial court judgment, this reason-
ing similarly applies in the context of acceptance of benefits problems. 
In the acceptance of benefits context, the court has a procedural inter-
est in allowing a party to exercise the statutory right to challenge per-
ceived errors in the course of the trial 144 as well as an interest in 
enforcing settlement agreements under appropriate circumstances. 
The balance between these two competing desires points toward the 
application of the intent-based rule in all federal cases. 
If a court applies the acceptance of benefits doctrine hastily, the 
court may resolve litigation before its natural conclusion. Thus, fol-
lowing a more restrictive state acceptance of benefits rule may lead a 
federal court to terminate litigation prematurely and disrupt a plain-
tiff's appeal rights. The federal court has a strong interest in seeing 
that an early resolution only occurs under circumstances it deems 
appropriate. 
The Fifth Circuit used this rationale in an analogous situation in 
Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright. 145 In Lumberman's, 
the trial court, sitting in diversity, faced a conflict between discretion-
ary dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a state rule that mandated dismissal 
after five years. Because the Fifth Circuit decided the case before the 
Supreme Court decision in Hanna, the court applied the Byrd balanc-
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) gives the federal circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction over most 
appeals from final district court decisions. The right for a plaintiff aggrieved by a final district 
court decision to appeal stems from this provision. See supra note 67. 
142. 715 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1983). 
143. 715 F.2d at 115 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
144. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
145. 322 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963). 
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ing test to decide which rule to apply. When discussing countervailing 
interests in favor of the federal rule, the Fifth Circuit commented: 
Federal courts should be able to prescribe rules for the administration of 
the cases to be tried before them. . . . As long as there is still the breath 
of life in a suit kept alive by the federal courts, it strikes us as unseemly 
to allow the state to kill the case.146 
These concerns about the federal court system and the premature end 
to cases within the federal court system support the application of a 
federal rule to the acceptance of benefits in order to prevent state pro-
cedures from ending a case in a manner the federal court system 
deems inappropriate. 
At the same time, applying a state rule more lenient than the in-
tent-based approach would endanger the federal courts' policy to en-
courage settlements. The federal courts seek to give effect to 
settlements whenever possible to preserve judicial resources and pro-
vide for the amicable resolution of disputes. 147 Applying a state rule 
that allows too many plaintiffs to appeal despite the acceptance of ben-
efits would frustrate these federal courts' efforts. In this fashion, state 
rules both more and less strict than the intent-based approach could 
jeopardize vital interests of federal forums. 
The acceptance of benefits implicates federal concerns beyond the 
structure of the court system. Federal courts also have an interest in 
the just adjudication of claims and in ensuring fair dealing between the 
parties of a lawsuit. 148 The interest arises when a strict acceptance of 
benefits rule enables a defendant's actions to create a trap for the un-
wary plaintiff. Courts must balance this concern against the federal 
policy in favor of voluntary settlements, 149 an interest that arises from 
the federal courts' desire to control their dockets and reduce unneces-
sary litigation. 150 The balance between these concerns weighs heavily 
in the decision whether to accept this Note's intent-based acceptance 
of benefits rule. 151 
By denying an appeal based on state rules that restrict appeal more 
than the federal rule, courts may undermine the just adjudication of 
claims and fair dealing between the parties. But adhering to a more 
liberal state rule on the acceptance of benefits can create unwanted 
congestion and violate the manifest intent of the parties. This conges-
tion obstructs the federal courts' interests in controlling their dockets. 
146. 322 F.2d at 765. 
147. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. 
148. Auer v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Autera v. 
Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
149. See Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 429 
U.S. 862 (1976); Autera, 419 F.2d at 1199. 
150. See Auer, 830 F.2d at 538; see also White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 
530 (5th Cir. 1986). 
151. See supra notes 53-57, 85 and accompanying text. 
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All these federal interests strike a careful balance in the intent-based 
acceptance of benefits rule. Following a state rule that deviates from 
this intent-based approach may frustrate one or more of these federal 
concerns. 
3. Application of the Outcome-Determinative Test 
Although federal interests favor applying a federal rule to the ac-
ceptance of benefits, courts must also focus on the extent to which the 
federal rule might disturb the outcome of a proceeding. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Hanna v. Plumer, 152 courts must view the 
outcome-determinative test not in terms of slight effects on the ulti-
mate determination of a case, but in consideration of the aims of Erie 
- to discourage forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws. 
Considered in light of the goals of Erie, the acceptance of benefits 
does not appear to be outcome-determinative. Acceptance of benefits 
problems only arise, if ever, after a trial has already concluded and the 
plaintiff has accepted payment of a judgment in her favor. This se-
quence of contingencies makes the application of the acceptance of 
benefits rule remote from the perspective of a plaintiff filing suit. This 
remoteness minimizes the likelihood that a plaintiff will choose a fo-
rum based on its acceptance of benefits rule. 153 Such a result differs 
markedly from cases such as those involving competing statutes of 
limitations in which a federal rule might allow a court to hear a case 
when a state rule would not. Acceptance of benefits issues, then, arise 
only after the trial court has already provisionally granted a remedy 
that should mirror the result of a state court proceeding. Because a 
plaintiff has already won a judgment in a trial that follows state sub-
stantive rules, limits on the plaintiff's right to appeal have a minimal 
effect in creating different remedies between state and federal forums. 
In this fashion, a federal acceptance of benefits rule should not invoke 
concerns about the inequitable administration of the laws between fed-
eral and state forums. 
In the analogous context of a remittitur, federal courts have found 
that the outcome-determinative test does not favor the application of 
state law. Remittitur is a common law procedure that allows a trial 
court judge to grant the defendant a new trial unless the plaintiff 
agrees to a reduced damage award. 154 Under the federal rule, a plain-
tiff who accepts the reduced award cannot appeal because she has ac-
152. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
153. See United States ex rel. H & S Indus. v. F.D. Rich Co., 525 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 
1975) (acknowledging that the aims of Erie "would not be served by applying state law to a 
problem of procedure which would arise, if at all, after completion of trial"). 
154. See generally 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 2807, 2815 (1973) (explaining remittitur). 
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quiesced in the judgment. 155 Courts have recognized that a 
remittitur's remoteness from the onset of a trial reduces any potential 
influence on the outcome of the litigation.156 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has held that federal courts should apply the federal 
remittitur rule in diversity actions because federal interests outweigh 
any forum-shopping and equitable concerns.157 Like remittitur cases, 
acceptance of benefits cases involve a plaintiff who has accepted a pay-
ment and still seeks to appeal errors in the trial court. The federal 
courts' observations of the remoteness of remittitur problems suggest 
that outcome-determinativeness concerns similarly do not mandate 
the application of the state rule to the acceptance of benefits cases. 
Balanced against policies that argue for the federal rule, the inter-
ests in favor of a state rule are inadequate. A federally imposed intent-
based acceptance of benefits rule should not seriously implicate con-
cerns about outcome determinativeness and states' freedom to deter-
mine local policies. Moreover, countervailing interests argue strongly 
for applying the federal acceptance of benefits rule. These policies in-
clude the maintenance and integrity of the federal appellate system, 
the just adjudication of claims, and the promotion of fair dealings be-
tween the parties. This balance in favor of federal interests should 
direct courts facing acceptance of benefits questions in diversity ac-
tions to apply the federal rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts formerly followed a uniform rule on the accept-
ance of benefits and prevented a prevailing party who accepted pay-
ment of a judgment from appealing unless the amount accepted was 
not in controversy or the judgment consisted of divisible issues. The 
Supreme Court decision in Hougham questioned the validity of the 
traditional rule but left no clear rule for courts to follow. A division in 
the federal courts ensued. Some courts followed the letter of 
Hougham, others created new rules, while still others continued to 
recognize the traditional rule. Courts have also disagreed about 
whether to apply the federal or state rule when sitting in diversity. 
This Note has argued for a consistent approach to the acceptance 
of benefits. Both the traditional rule and a rule that would always 
allow a plaintiff to appeal present difficulties. By inferring a settlement 
that the parties did not intend, the traditional rule can operate to vio-
late the appeal rights and clear intent of parties who wish to appeal. A 
rule that always allows an appeal, however, frustrates the federal pol-
icy in favor of settlements. Thus, federal courts should adopt a rule 
155. E.g., Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977). 
156. See, e.g., Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy., 382 F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir. 1967). 
157. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 649-50. 
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that prevents an appeal only if the parties mutually and demonstrably 
intended to terminate litigation through payment of the judgment. 
This approach respects the intent of the parties but simultaneously 
facilitates settlements in appropriate circumstances. 
This Note also supports a uniform approach to acceptance of bene-
fits problems in diversity actions. Deciding which rule to apply re-
quires a diversity court carefully to balance competing interests. 
These interests include the state substantive policies inherent in local 
rules, the policy in favor of uniform outcomes between state and fed-
eral diversity forums, and federal interests in the application of a fed-
eral rule. In the acceptance of benefits problems, the concerns for 
uniform outcomes and state substantive policies do not argue strongly 
for a state rule in diversity actions; meanwhile, strong federal interests 
in favor of the federal rule that this Note advocates do exist. These 
concerns include the maintenance of the federal system of appeal and 
the desire to encourage only voluntary settlements, and they argue for 
the adoption of a federal rule on the acceptance of benefits in diversity 
cases. As with acceptance of benefits issues in federal question cases, a 
court should look to the mutual intent of the parties. 
